Lätis valitakse presidenti veniva võimukriisi varjus
29. mai 2007
Neljapäeval koguneb Läti parlament valima järglast Ida-Euroopa esimesele naispresidendile Vaira Vike-Freibergale, kelle teine ametiaeg lõpeb 7. juulil.
Sarnaselt Eestiga on Läti parlamentaarne vabariik, kus rahva valitud sada seimisaadikut otsustavad, kes erakondade esitatud kandidaatidest riigipeaks saab.
Erinevalt Eestist pole aga Lätis valimiskogu, nii et parlamendist välja valimised ei lähe. Kandidaat osutub valituks, kui ta kogub enamuse ehk 51 häält.
Võimul olev koalitsioon koosneb Rahvaerakonnast, kristlikust Esimese Partei ja Läti Tee blokist, Roheliste ja Põllumeeste Liidust ning Isamaast, kellel on kokku 57 häält. Kuigi näib, et presidendi valimisega ei peaks probleeme tekkima, ei luba vinduv võimukriis ja valitsusliidu lahkhelid ennustada ühegi kandidaadi selget võitu esimeses voorus.
Parlament sattus tööhoogu
Kriis sai alguse mullu septembris, kui Läti prokuratuur esitas Ventspilsi linnapeale Aivars Lembergsile süüdistuse võimu kuritarvitamises ja rahapesus. Vastuolude süvenedes pani president Vaira Vike-Freiberga 10. märtsil veto julgeolekuseadusele, millega valitsus oleks tema arvates omandanud liialt suure võimu, ja selle üle tuleb juulis referendum.
Pärast vetot tegutses parlament kärmelt ja saavutas järgmise kuu jooksul sellise “tootlikkuse”, mida pole nähtud varasema 15 aasta jooksul. Rahvaesindajad pöördusid tagasi julgeolekuseaduse algvariandi juurde, tühistasid põhiseaduse kurikuulsa 81. artikli (mis võimaldas valitsusel julgeolekuseaduse läbi suruda ilma parlamendita) ja valisid esimese õiguskantslerina ametisse Romans Apsitise.
Endine konstitutsioonikohtu liige Aivars Endzinš arvab, et seimi niivõrd kiire meelemuutus oli seotud parlamendiliikmete kartusega oma koha pärast.
Alates 14. märtsist, mil Ventspilsi linnapea vangistati, on Lätis liikvel jutud nn Lembergsi stipendiaatidest. Ehk siis räägitakse nende poliitikute nimekirjast, keda rahastas Ventspilsi linnapea grupeering.
Kriminaaluurimise all olev Lembergs oli oktoobris toimunud parlamendivalimistel Roheliste ja Põllumeeste Liidu (RPL) peaministrikandidaat. RPL sai sajaliikmelises seimis 18 kohta ja koalitsioonileppega eraldati neile nelja ministri ja parlamendi esimehe kohad.
17. mail võttis seim vastu inflatsiooniga võitlemise programmi ja ratifitseeris Läti-Vene piirilepingu. Piirileppe vastu on enne konstitutsioonikohtu otsust teravalt välja astunud opositsioonierakond Uus Aeg. Inflatsioonivastast tegevuskava ei ole jõuetuks nimetanud mitte ainult vastasrind, vaid ka majanduseksperdid.
Ülekuumenenud majandus ja korruptsioonisüüdistused pingestavad Läti poliitikat enne 7. juulil toimuvat referendumit, milles poliitikaeksperdid näevad ühtlasi umbusaldusavaldust valitseva eliidi vastu.
Rohelised ja põllumehed tule all
•• Valitsusliidu tugevust vähendab asjaolu, et Aivars Lembergsiga seostatud RPL-i ministrid ja seimi esimees on tule all.
•• Põllumehed on nõudnud põllumajandusminister Martin‰ Roze ametist lahkumist EL-i nõuete kohta valetamise tõttu. Pärast Läti kõigi aegade ohvriterohkeimat põlengut Regi hooldekodus nõudis opositsioon heaoluminister Dagnija Stake tagasiastumist. Haridusminister Baiba Rivžale on aga saadetud 6000 õpetaja allkirjaga petitsioon, milles nõutakse palgatõusu. Kuna inflatsioon on 8,9 protsenti aastas, on avalikus sektoris töötavate inimeste palgad muutunud naeruväärseks ja pedagoogid on ähvardanud streigiga.
•• Ka parlamendi esimehe kõned on tekitanud küsitavusi – Indulis Emsis otsib kõikjalt Sorose ja rahvusvahelise finantskapitali vandenõud Läti vastu.
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Thursday, May 24, 2007
There are TWO in the presidential mini-race!
Rollercoaster in the Latvian politics carries on! Yesterday the New Era party nominee, Ms Sandra Kalniete publickly renounced her candidacy in favour of the former senator of the Constitutional Court, Mr Aivars Endziņš! Mr Endziņš was nominated by the Reconciliation Party this Wednesday. The events in presidential-mini race are thus fast, that it is becoming more and more interesting to watch what happens next within the black box of the Latvian party politics.
So, what do we have now? There are candidates from the governing coalition (51+8 votes) and opposition (18+17 votes) now. The race for the hearts and minds of the Latvian MP's has begun!!!
In the yesterday's TV emission Kas notiek Latvijā? there was only one winner - Mr. Endzinš who colleccted about 15 thousand TV spectators votes, while Ms Kalniete and Mr Zatlers got about 4 thousand each. Mr Aivars Endziņš with his steely mind and unequivocal pronouncements against the traditional rules of the game of the Latvian oligarchic elite is certainly the favourite of the majority of Latvian citizens - a true would be people's president.
Go, Aivars Endziņš go!!
So, what do we have now? There are candidates from the governing coalition (51+8 votes) and opposition (18+17 votes) now. The race for the hearts and minds of the Latvian MP's has begun!!!
In the yesterday's TV emission Kas notiek Latvijā? there was only one winner - Mr. Endzinš who colleccted about 15 thousand TV spectators votes, while Ms Kalniete and Mr Zatlers got about 4 thousand each. Mr Aivars Endziņš with his steely mind and unequivocal pronouncements against the traditional rules of the game of the Latvian oligarchic elite is certainly the favourite of the majority of Latvian citizens - a true would be people's president.
Go, Aivars Endziņš go!!
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Moscow and Baltic Russian minorities
Analysts Discuss Integration Problems in Latvia, Estonia, Russia
BBC Monitoring European2007-05-23
Text of report by Latvian internet portal politika.lv on 22 May
[Commentary by Andris Spruds and Veiko Spolitis of the Riga Stradins University: "Elites, Kremlin, Minorities in Baltic States"]
The governing coalition in Latvia at this time is obviously trying to improve relations with Russia. The problem is that in any relationship, there must be mutual interest. In other words, "it takes two to tango". Events in Estonia have created questions about the depth of integrating the Russian speaking segment of society in Estonia and Latvia, about the presence and role of Russia in these events, and about the nature and goals of its "compatriot policy".
Technologies today ignore physical boundaries, and satellite television and Internet services help countries to reach audiences which used to be reached only through the use of lectors. The minority policies of the Baltic States are still being reviewed in relation to what is happening in Russia. Recent events in Tallinn [where riots followed the transport of a Soviet-era military statue[] convinced sceptics that it was right to decide to join the EU and NATO, but irrespective of membership in those organizations, the Baltic States still must ensure balanced development in their societies - something that is a prerequisite for their long-term sovereign autonomy. In the first part of this article, we will try to define the goals and instruments of Russia's "compatriot" policy. In the second, we shall analyse differences between Latvia and Estonia in terms of the situation of minorities.
Russia's "Compatriot" Policy
Vladimir Putin [the Russian president] has shored up the vertical nature of power in domestic and foreign policy in Russia. It is obvious that foreign policy has become more coordinated, expressive and self-confident as a result of the "energy muscles" that have been pumped up. Small countries which are Russia's neighbours are going to have to count on the fact that a major power which has recovered from a period of weakness usually also seeks to regain its influence. As the Kremlin seeks to minimize losses in the post- Soviet space that were caused by the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century - the collapse of the USSR", we see more than just the attributes of "hard power" such as nuclear weapons and energy supplies. There are also lost of "post-imperial" or "soft power" instruments - sales and labour market offers, the attractiveness of increased welfare and culture, mentioning of norms, and historical symbols.
Norms and symbols have always played an important role in Russian policy when it comes to compatriots in the Baltic States, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. In the 1990s, Russian behaviour only involved the "stick" - criticisms about citizenship and language laws at the international level and in bilateral relations. These complaints were repeated again and again, and even economic sanctions were suggested as a possibility. It has to be said that Russia's public criticisms of the treatment of non-citizens did not have an influence on generally constructive bilateral relations even until 1998. We must remember the crisis which Estonia experienced in 1993, when people in the Narva region basically refused to obey the Estonian government, and Russia joined the OSCE in mediating the conflict. We can ask here, of course, whether this was a manifestation of good will or something that was dictated by political and economic needs. No matter what the motivation was for the Kremlin's activities at that time, the clear fact is that Russia lacked the political and historical symbols and financial resources which could be used to mobilize Russian speakers in any effective way. One example is the now-politicized Victory Day celebration it was officially recognized in Russia only in 1995.
Changes in Situation
The situation has changed now. In addition to rhetoric about discrimination against Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia, the Russian government clearly wishes to promote far broader mobilization among Russian speaking groups in society, and it appears that it is able to do so. The "parallel society" which mostly focused on Russia used to be based on individual political forces, economic groups with specific interests, and apathetic people who were dissatisfied. Right now the vitality of Russia's external image, its ongoing talk of historical and cultural communities, and its financial support - all of this can activate wider segments of the Russian speaking society. Celebrations on May 9 [Victory Day] in Tallinn and Riga showed that Russia's active reference to historical symbols found lots of supporters, including many young people.
We do have to remember, however, that the nature and motivation of Russia's "compatriot" policy are not dictated by foreign policy considerations alone. To quote Russia's 19th-century foreign minister, Aleksandr Gorchakov, Russia is simultaneously "a mighty and a weak country". One of the greatest shortcomings for Russia is that there is no idea which unifies the entire country. Right now that idea is based more on individual symbols of the past, as well as on the current energy-related power which Russia enjoys. There is no clear ideology as to the future of Russia. As president, Vladimir Putin has largely embodied the desires of a large share of the Russian people. This personified idea of statehood, however, cannot be long-lasting, particularly once Putin leaves the presidency. Apparently the political forces which will appear in the Russian public space in advance of the election will try to compete over the image of the greatest defender of the ideas of patriotism. The problem is that this situation is close to populism and to the search for an external enemy. The political battle and the need for self-identification will certainly mean that Russia's position vis- a-vis Russian speakers and relations with Latvia and Estonia will involve greater contradiction and emotionality.
Increased civic consciousness and pluralism in society certainly are commendable, but a potentially dangerous cocktail is being created by the dissatisfaction of that share of society which has not always been successfully integrated or that does not always want to become integrated. This is combined with the "search for itself" of another country, complete with all of the manipulations that are possible. It is increasingly clear that we must prepare for March 16 [when some Latvians commemorate a German military unit from World War II] and May 9 as dates when there will be physical and emotional confrontations among certain segments of society - a process which walks in lockstep with exacerbated bilateral relations between countries. This clearly demonstrates the difficulties and limitations in consolidating a post-imperial society and in normalizing bilateral relations.
Minorities in Estonia, Latvia
When it discusses its compatriots in the Baltic States, official Russia constantly tries to use the term "Russian speakers". Unnoticed, it has become part of the everyday vocabulary in Estonia and Latvia. This is a description of the unified space of the Baltic States that is handy for the Kremlin, because the fact is that Lithuanians, Latvians and, to a lesser extent but nevertheless, Estonians have always been bilingual. More research is needed to find out why discussions in Latvia and Estonia make use of the description of the Russian minority in the Baltic States that was conjured up by political technologists at the Kremlin, but the fact is that despite differences in the political description of these minorities, discussions about minorities in Latvia and Estonia have mostly defined differences in party politics and in the positions taken by local residents.
Unlike in Latvia, the Russian community in Estonia lives quite compactly in the Northeast of the country and in the bedroom communities of Tallinn. In terms of population numbers, there were 10 per cent more ethnic Estonians at the beginning of the 1990s in Estonia than there was of Latvians in Latvia. Strengthening the positions of the Latvian and Estonian language was a specific component in national party programmes. Unlike in Latvia, however, the political elite in Estonia was not scared of unpopular decisions related to liberal economics and tax policies. In 1991, for instance, Estonia introduced a system of tax declarations which eventually was a prerequisite for the development of a transparency economic and political system. Unified rules of the game allowed members of the Russian community who did not have citizenship to integrate successfully into Estonia's business sphere. Representatives of the Russian community in Latvia, unlike in Estonia, had to accept the principles of "policies of nepotism" that were used in Latvia. In recent statements about the perception of corruption, Estonia is gradually distancing itself from Latvia.
It may be that the development of Russian parties on the left wing of politics in Latvia can be attributed to the fact that the Russian community here is relative larger, that Soviet traditions continue to exist in Latvia's larger towns and cities, and that there is a unique political environment here. The Russian Party in Estonia, as well as other political movements which represent the Russian community, were distinct pocket parties until the events of 26 April 2007 [when the Estonian government moved a Soviet military memorial to a military cemetery]. They could not overcome the 5 per cent vote barrier that is necessary to win seats in Parliament. That is why the Centre Party of Edgar Savisaar has represented the interests of the Russian minority at the political level since 1995. In addition to Savisaar's party on the centre left, leftist policies in the Estonian parliament are also represented by the Social Democrats. Parties in the Estonian parliament operate on the basis of ideology, not ethnicity, and in this they differ from the situation in Latvia, where there are Latvian right wing and Russian left wing parties.
Haughtiness of Politicians Splits, Weakens
During the April riots, Savisaar was mayor of Tallinn, and his failure to act pushed quite a few voters away from his party. Events in Tallinn, similarly to what happened when Latvia introduced school reforms, showed that integration policy requires active consultations between both sides. A multicultural society does not appear all on its own. It is the duty of the political elite to make sure that the integration of a multicultural and political nation does not occur in a slipshod way. Estonia's governing politicians were convinced about themselves, and they delayed Russian language reforms in Estonian schools. That is precisely the reason why integration policies developed during the last few years absolutely collapsed in Tallinn in April of this year. The events in Tallinn showed that differences in the historical interpretation of Estonians and Russians are expanding, not narrowing. There are fundamental differences between Estonians and Russians with respect to the quality of life in the future and about future relations with Russia. Research done by the Estonian sociologist Andrus Saar shows that differences between the Estonian and the Russian communities in Estonia are not dependent on increased economic welfare.
In this situation, it would be short-sighted to rely on the principles of the free market in integration policy. Economic policy has only an indirect effect on the integration of a political nation. It is utopian to think that people who came from the collective society of the Soviet Union will learn about their rights without the appropriate education and will join together into a political nation in Latvia or Estonia. A power change is taking place in Russia right now, and domestic policy positions affect the Russian communities of Latvia and Estonia. It is vitally important to ensure equal rules of the economic game, to work very hard on links between those who are integrating and those who are being integrated. The rules of the economic game are clear in Estonia, but the Estonian government must now compensate for the tactical mistakes which were the result of the haughtiness of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Latvia must continue with the integration policies that have been launched, but at long last we must make our economic system transparent, we must introduce a system of tax declarations, we must stop the spiraling process of inflation, and we must reduce our current accounts deficit. Governments in both countries must think about how to resolve a problem that is acute both for Latvia and for Estonia - how to ensure high-quality TV broadcasts in Russian about events in Estonia and Latvia, thus reducing the pressure of propaganda which comes from Kremlin-controlled information channels at this time.
(c) 2007 BBC Monitoring European. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning. All rights Reserved.
Elite, Kremlis un minoritātes Baltijā
Andris Sprūds, Veiko Spolītis, RSU mācībspēki
Latvijas valdošā koalīcija šobrīd acīmredzami cenšas uzlabot attiecības ar Krieviju. Tomēr kā jebkurās attiecībās nepieciešama abpusēja ieinteresētība jeb, citiem vārdiem, divi partneri, lai „nodejotu tango”. Igaunijas notikumi radījuši jautājumus gan par krievvalodīgo sabiedrības integrācijas dziļumu Igaunijā un Latvijā, gan par Krievijas klātbūtni un lomu šajos notikumos, tās „tautiešu politikas” raksturu un mērķiem. Šodienas tehnoloģijas neievēro fiziskas robežas, tāpēc satelīta televīzija un internets palīdz valstīm sasniegt auditorijas, kuras agrāk bija jāsasniedz ar lektoru palīdzību. Baltijas valstu minoritāšu politika joprojām tiek skatīta saistībā ar Krievijā notiekošo. Nesenie notikumi Tallinā pārliecināja skeptiķus par dalību ES un NATO lēmuma pareizību, tomēr neatkarīgi no dalības šajās organizācijās Baltijas valstīm joprojām ir jānodrošina sabiedrības līdzsvarota attīstība, kas ir priekšnoteikums to suverēnai autonomijai ilgtermiņā. Tāpēc šis raksts centīsies pirmajā daļā skaidrot Krievijas „tautiešu” politikas mērķus un instrumentus un otrajā daļā analizēt Latvijas un Igaunijas atšķirības minoritāšu situācijā.
Krievijas „tautiešu” politika
Vladimirs Putins ir stiprinājis varas vertikāli gan iekšpolitikā, gan ārpolitikā. Acīmredzami, ārējā politika ir kļuvusi koordinētāka, izteiksmīgāka un uzaudzēto „enerģētikas muskuļu” iespaidā — pašpārliecinātāka. Kaimiņos esošajām mazajām valstīm jārēķinās, ka lielvalsts, kas atguvusies no vājuma posma, parasti tiecas arī atgūt savu ietekmi. „20. gadsimta lielākās ģeopolitiskās katastrofas — PSRS sabrukuma” zaudējumu minimizēšanā postpadomju telpā Kremļa rīcībā nav tikai „cietās varas” atribūti: kodolieroči vai enerģētika, bet arī vesela virkne „postimperiālo” jeb „mīkstās varas” instrumentu: noieta un darba tirgu piedāvājums, pieaugošas labklājības un kultūras pievilcība, normu piesaukšana un vēsturiskie simboli.
Normas un simboli spēlējuši nozīmīgu lomu Krievijas politikā attiecībā uz tautiešiem Baltijā, visupirms Igaunijā un Latvijā. 90. gados Krievijas rīcībā pamatā bija tikai „nūjas ietekmes” iespējas —kritika par pilsonības un valodas likumdošanas normām starptautiskā līmenī un divpusējās attiecībās, un tā tika atkārtota bieži un asi, piesaucot arī ekonomisko sankciju iespējamību. Tomēr jāatzīst, Krievijas publiskā kritika par izturēšanos pret nepilsoņiem faktiski līdz pat 1998. gadam neietekmēja kopumā konstruktīvas divpusējās attiecības. Zīmīga šajā sakarā bija Igaunijas krīze 1993. gadā, kad Narvas reģiona iedzīvotāji faktiski atteicās pakļauties Igaunijas valdībai un Kremlis kopā ar EDSO kļuva par konflikta starpniekiem. Protams, šeit varētu jautāt, vai šāda nostāja bija labas gribas izpausme vai politiskas un ekonomiskas nepieciešamības diktēta. Lai kāda arī būtu Kremļa toreizējas rīcības motivācija, nepārprotami ir tas, ka Krievijai trūka politisko un vēsturisko simbolu un finansiālo līdzekļu, ar kuru palīdzību tā spētu efektīvi mobilizēt krieviski runājošo sabiedrību. Piemēram, šobrīd tik aktualizētos Uzvaras svētkus postkomunistiskajā Krievijā oficiāli atkal sāka atzīmēt tikai 1995. gadā.
Šobrīd situācija ir mainījusies. Papildus retorikai par krievvalodīgo diskrimināciju Igaunijā un Latvijā Krievijas valdība acīmredzami vēlas un spēj veicināt daudz plašāku krievvalodīgo sabiedrības grupu mobilizāciju. Iepriekš „paralēlā sabiedrība”, kas pārsvarā orientējās uz Krieviju, Latvijā un Igaunijā galvenokārt sastāvēja no atsevišķiem politiskajiem spēkiem, ekonomiski ieinteresētiem grupējumiem un apātiskiem neapmierinātajiem. Pašlaik Krievijas ārējā tēla vitalitāte, vēsturiskās un kultūras kopības piesaukšana, kā arī finansiālais atbalsts jau spēj aktivizēt plašākas krievvalodīgo sabiedrības daļas. Kā parādīja 9. maija atzīmēšana gan Tallinā, gan Rīgā, Krievijas aktīva atsaukšanās uz vēsturiskajiem simboliem atrada ne mazums dzirdīgu ausu, ieskaitot jaunu cilvēku vidū.
Jāņem gan arī vērā, ka Krievijas gadījumā, tās „tautiešu” politikas raksturu un motivāciju nosaka ne tikai ārpolitiskie apsvērumi. Krievijas 19. gadsimta ārlietu ministra Aleksandra Gorčakova vārdiem runājot, Krievija ir vienlaicīgi „gan varena, gan vāja valsts”. Krievijas viens no vislielākajiem trūkumiem ir valsti vienojošas idejas trūkums. Pašlaik tā vairāk veidojas no atsevišķiem pagātnes simboliem un pašreizējā enerģētiskā lielvalstiskuma pasvītrošanas nevis skaidras nākotnes idejiskās vīzijas. Vladimirs Putins kā prezidents lielā mērā kļuvis par lielas Krievijas sabiedrības daļas vēlmju iemiesotāju. Tomēr šāda personificēta valstiskā ideja nevar būt ilglaicīga, īpaši Putinam atstājot prezidenta amatu. Acīmredzami, Krievijas publiskajā telpā pirms vēlēšanām politiskie spēki būs tendēti konkurēt par lielākā patriotisma ideju aizstāvju imidžu, un šādās situācijās nav tālu ne līdz populismam, ne ienaidnieka tēlu meklēšanai. Politiskā cīņa un pašidentifikācijas nepieciešamība Krievijas nostājai krievvalodīgo jautājumā un attiecībām ar Latviju un Igauniju noteikti piedos papildus pretrunīguma un emocionalitātes devu.
Pilsoniskās apziņas un aktivitātes pieaugums un plurālisms sabiedrībā noteikti ir apsveicama parādība, tomēr potenciāli bīstamu kokteili veido ne vienmēr veiksmīgi integrētas vai arī ne vienmēr integrēties vēlošas sabiedrības daļas neapmierinātība kombinācijā ar citas valsts „sevis meklējumiem” un manipulācijas iespējām. Un arvien izteiktāka tendence, ka 16. martam un 9. maijam jāgatavojas kā sabiedrības daļu fiziskai un emocionālai konfrontācijai, kas iet kopsolī ar starpvalstu divpusējo attiecību saasināšanos, skaidri demonstrē postimperiālas sabiedrības konsolidācijas un starpvalstu attiecību normalizācijas grūtības un ierobežojumus.
Minoritātes Igaunijā un Latvijā
Runājot par tautiešiem Baltijas valstīs, oficiālā Krievija cenšas nemitīgi izmantot terminu krievvalodīgie, kas ir nemanot iegājis arī Igaunijas un Latvijas ikdienas valodas apritē. Šis ir Kremlim parocīgs apzīmējums Baltijas valstu vienotās telpas raksturošanai, jo tradicionāli lietuvieši, latvieši, un, lai arī mazāk, tomēr arī igauņi ir bijuši divvalodīgi. Iemesliem, kāpēc Latvijas un Igaunijas diskusijās tiek izmantots Kremļa polittehnologu apzīmējums krievu minoritātei Baltijas valstīs, ir nepieciešams cits pētījums. Tomēr, neskatoties uz minoritāšu raksturlieluma politisku apzīmējumu atšķirībām, Latvijas un Igaunijas diskusijas par minoritātēm galvenokārt ir noteikušas atšķirības partiju politikā un iedzīvotāju izvietojumā.
Atšķirībā no Latvijas Igaunijas krievu kopiena dzīvo kompakti valsts Ziemeļaustrumos un Tallinas guļamrajonos. Iedzīvotāju kopskaita ziņā etnisko igauņu 1990. gadu sākumā bija par 10 % vairāk nekā latviešu. Latviešu un igauņu valodas pozīciju nostiprināšana bija nacionālo partiju programmas noteikta daļa. Tomēr atšķirībā no Latvijas politiskā elite Igaunijā nebaidījās pieņemt tautā nepopulārus liberālas ekonomikas un nodokļu politikas lēmumus. Šādi, piemēram, 1991. gadā tika ieviesta nodokļu deklarēšanas sistēma, kura kalpoja par priekšnoteikumu caurskatāmas ekonomiskās un politiskās sistēmas attīstībai. Vienoti spēles noteikumi atļāva bez pilsonības palikušajiem krievu kopienas pārstāvjiem veiksmīgi integrēties Igaunijas uzņēmējdarbības sfērā. Atšķirībā no Igaunijas Latvijas krievu kopienas pārstāvjiem bija jāspēlē pēc Latvijā pieņemtajiem „nepotisma politikas” principiem, un pēdējo gadu korupcijas uztveres novērtējumos Igaunija pakāpeniski attālinās no Latvijas.[1]
Iespējams, tieši relatīvi lielāka krievu kopiena un padomju tradīcijas Latvijas lielākajās pilsētās kombinācijā ar savdabīgo politisko vidi noteica krievu partiju attīstību politiskā spektra kreisajā flangā. Atšķirībā no Latvijas, Igaunijas Krievu partija un citas krievu kopienu pārstāvošas politiskās kustības līdz 2007. gada 26. aprīļa notikumiem bija izteiktas kabatas partijas, kuras nespēja pārvarēt iekļūšanai parlamentā nepieciešamo 5 % barjeru. Tāpēc krievu minoritātes intereses politiskā līmenī kopš 1995. gada ir pārstāvējusi Edgara Savisāra (Edgar Savisaar) Centra partija. Papildus E. Savisāra kreisi centriskajai partijai Igaunijas parlamentā kreiso politiku pārstāv arī sociāldemokrāti. Šādi atšķirībā no Latvijas etniskā dalījuma latviešu labējās un krievu kreisajās partijās Igaunijas parlamenta partijas darbojas nevis pēc etniskā, bet gan ideoloģiskā principa.
Politiķu uzpūtība šķeļ un vājina
Aprīļa grautiņu laikā Tallinas mērs Savisārs ar savu neizdarību no savas partijas atstūma ne vienu vien vēlētāju. Tallinas notikumi līdzīgi Latvijas skolu reformas ieviešanai sekojošajiem notikumiem parādīja, ka integrācijas politikā ir nepieciešamas abu iesaistīto pušu aktīvas konsultācijas. Multikulturāla sabiedrība nerodas pati no sevis, politiskajai elitei ir pienākums nodrošināt, lai multikulturālas un politiskas nācijas integrācija nenotiek pašplūsmā. Tieši valdošo politiķu pašpārliecinātība, iekavētā krievu valodas reforma Igaunijas skolās noteica pēdējo gadu integrācijas politikas izgāšanos Tallinā šā gada aprīļa beigās. Tallinas notikumu fonā atklājās, ka atšķirības igauņu un krievu kopienas vēstures interpretācijā nevis samazinās, bet gan palielinās.[2] Kardinālas atšķirības starp igauņiem un krieviem eksistē gan uztverē par nākotnes dzīves kvalitāti, gan arī par nākotnes attiecībām ar Krieviju. Igauņu sociologa Andrusa Sāra (Andrus Saar) pētījumi atklāj, ka atšķirības starp igauņu un krievu kopienām Igaunijā nav atkarīgi no ekonomiskās labklājības pieauguma.[3]
Šādā situācijā būtu tuvredzīgi paļauties uz brīvā tirgus principiem integrācijas politikā. Ekonomiskā labklājība tikai pastarpināti veicina politiskas nācijas integrāciju. Tāpēc paļauties, ka no padomju kolektīvās sabiedrības nākuši cilvēki bez attiecīgas izglītības kļūs par savas tiesības zinošiem indivīdiem un vienosies Igaunijas vai Latvijas politiskā nācijā, ir utopija. Situācijā, kad Krievijā notiek varas maiņa un iekšpolitiskā pozicionēšanās skar Latvijas un Igaunijas krievu kopienas, ir vitāli svarīgi nodrošināt vienādus ekonomiskās spēles noteikumus un aktīvi strādāt integrētājiem ar integrējamajiem. Igaunijas gadījumā ekonomiskās spēles noteikumi ir atklāti, bet Igaunijas valdībai šobrīd ir jānovērš premjera Ansipa (Andrus Ansip) vīzdegunības dēļ pieļautās taktiskās kļūdas. Latvijā ir jāturpina iesāktā integrācijas politika, bet ir beidzot jāpadara caurskatāma mūsu ekonomiskā sistēma, jāiedarbina nodokļu deklarēšanas sistēma, jāaptur inflācijas spirāle un jāsamazina tekošā konta deficīts. Abu valstu valdībām, savukārt, šobrīd ir jādomā, kā atrisināt Latvijas un Igaunijas akūtu problēmu — nodrošināt kvalitatīvas TV pārraides krievu valodā par notikumiem Igaunijā un Latvijā, šādi ļaujot mazināt Kremļa kontrolēto informācijas kanālu propagandas spiedienu.
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[1] 2006. gadā Transparency International indeksā Igaunija atradās 24. vietā un Latvija 49. vietā. http://www.trasnsparency.org/policy_%20research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006
[2] Integrācijas fonda pētījums parādīja, ka 2002. gadā 43% krievu uzskatīja, ka Igaunija brīvprātīgi iestājās PSRS, bet 2005. gadā šādu cilvēku skaits bija pieaudzis līdz 56%. Venelaste arvates astus Eesti vabatahtlikult Nõukogude Liitu http://www.sloleht.ee/ 2007. gada 21. maijā
[3] Andrus Sāra priekšlasījums Rīgā, organizācijas Dialogi diskusijas ietvaros 2007. gada 18. maijā
BBC Monitoring European2007-05-23
Text of report by Latvian internet portal politika.lv on 22 May
[Commentary by Andris Spruds and Veiko Spolitis of the Riga Stradins University: "Elites, Kremlin, Minorities in Baltic States"]
The governing coalition in Latvia at this time is obviously trying to improve relations with Russia. The problem is that in any relationship, there must be mutual interest. In other words, "it takes two to tango". Events in Estonia have created questions about the depth of integrating the Russian speaking segment of society in Estonia and Latvia, about the presence and role of Russia in these events, and about the nature and goals of its "compatriot policy".
Technologies today ignore physical boundaries, and satellite television and Internet services help countries to reach audiences which used to be reached only through the use of lectors. The minority policies of the Baltic States are still being reviewed in relation to what is happening in Russia. Recent events in Tallinn [where riots followed the transport of a Soviet-era military statue[] convinced sceptics that it was right to decide to join the EU and NATO, but irrespective of membership in those organizations, the Baltic States still must ensure balanced development in their societies - something that is a prerequisite for their long-term sovereign autonomy. In the first part of this article, we will try to define the goals and instruments of Russia's "compatriot" policy. In the second, we shall analyse differences between Latvia and Estonia in terms of the situation of minorities.
Russia's "Compatriot" Policy
Vladimir Putin [the Russian president] has shored up the vertical nature of power in domestic and foreign policy in Russia. It is obvious that foreign policy has become more coordinated, expressive and self-confident as a result of the "energy muscles" that have been pumped up. Small countries which are Russia's neighbours are going to have to count on the fact that a major power which has recovered from a period of weakness usually also seeks to regain its influence. As the Kremlin seeks to minimize losses in the post- Soviet space that were caused by the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century - the collapse of the USSR", we see more than just the attributes of "hard power" such as nuclear weapons and energy supplies. There are also lost of "post-imperial" or "soft power" instruments - sales and labour market offers, the attractiveness of increased welfare and culture, mentioning of norms, and historical symbols.
Norms and symbols have always played an important role in Russian policy when it comes to compatriots in the Baltic States, particularly in Estonia and Latvia. In the 1990s, Russian behaviour only involved the "stick" - criticisms about citizenship and language laws at the international level and in bilateral relations. These complaints were repeated again and again, and even economic sanctions were suggested as a possibility. It has to be said that Russia's public criticisms of the treatment of non-citizens did not have an influence on generally constructive bilateral relations even until 1998. We must remember the crisis which Estonia experienced in 1993, when people in the Narva region basically refused to obey the Estonian government, and Russia joined the OSCE in mediating the conflict. We can ask here, of course, whether this was a manifestation of good will or something that was dictated by political and economic needs. No matter what the motivation was for the Kremlin's activities at that time, the clear fact is that Russia lacked the political and historical symbols and financial resources which could be used to mobilize Russian speakers in any effective way. One example is the now-politicized Victory Day celebration it was officially recognized in Russia only in 1995.
Changes in Situation
The situation has changed now. In addition to rhetoric about discrimination against Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia, the Russian government clearly wishes to promote far broader mobilization among Russian speaking groups in society, and it appears that it is able to do so. The "parallel society" which mostly focused on Russia used to be based on individual political forces, economic groups with specific interests, and apathetic people who were dissatisfied. Right now the vitality of Russia's external image, its ongoing talk of historical and cultural communities, and its financial support - all of this can activate wider segments of the Russian speaking society. Celebrations on May 9 [Victory Day] in Tallinn and Riga showed that Russia's active reference to historical symbols found lots of supporters, including many young people.
We do have to remember, however, that the nature and motivation of Russia's "compatriot" policy are not dictated by foreign policy considerations alone. To quote Russia's 19th-century foreign minister, Aleksandr Gorchakov, Russia is simultaneously "a mighty and a weak country". One of the greatest shortcomings for Russia is that there is no idea which unifies the entire country. Right now that idea is based more on individual symbols of the past, as well as on the current energy-related power which Russia enjoys. There is no clear ideology as to the future of Russia. As president, Vladimir Putin has largely embodied the desires of a large share of the Russian people. This personified idea of statehood, however, cannot be long-lasting, particularly once Putin leaves the presidency. Apparently the political forces which will appear in the Russian public space in advance of the election will try to compete over the image of the greatest defender of the ideas of patriotism. The problem is that this situation is close to populism and to the search for an external enemy. The political battle and the need for self-identification will certainly mean that Russia's position vis- a-vis Russian speakers and relations with Latvia and Estonia will involve greater contradiction and emotionality.
Increased civic consciousness and pluralism in society certainly are commendable, but a potentially dangerous cocktail is being created by the dissatisfaction of that share of society which has not always been successfully integrated or that does not always want to become integrated. This is combined with the "search for itself" of another country, complete with all of the manipulations that are possible. It is increasingly clear that we must prepare for March 16 [when some Latvians commemorate a German military unit from World War II] and May 9 as dates when there will be physical and emotional confrontations among certain segments of society - a process which walks in lockstep with exacerbated bilateral relations between countries. This clearly demonstrates the difficulties and limitations in consolidating a post-imperial society and in normalizing bilateral relations.
Minorities in Estonia, Latvia
When it discusses its compatriots in the Baltic States, official Russia constantly tries to use the term "Russian speakers". Unnoticed, it has become part of the everyday vocabulary in Estonia and Latvia. This is a description of the unified space of the Baltic States that is handy for the Kremlin, because the fact is that Lithuanians, Latvians and, to a lesser extent but nevertheless, Estonians have always been bilingual. More research is needed to find out why discussions in Latvia and Estonia make use of the description of the Russian minority in the Baltic States that was conjured up by political technologists at the Kremlin, but the fact is that despite differences in the political description of these minorities, discussions about minorities in Latvia and Estonia have mostly defined differences in party politics and in the positions taken by local residents.
Unlike in Latvia, the Russian community in Estonia lives quite compactly in the Northeast of the country and in the bedroom communities of Tallinn. In terms of population numbers, there were 10 per cent more ethnic Estonians at the beginning of the 1990s in Estonia than there was of Latvians in Latvia. Strengthening the positions of the Latvian and Estonian language was a specific component in national party programmes. Unlike in Latvia, however, the political elite in Estonia was not scared of unpopular decisions related to liberal economics and tax policies. In 1991, for instance, Estonia introduced a system of tax declarations which eventually was a prerequisite for the development of a transparency economic and political system. Unified rules of the game allowed members of the Russian community who did not have citizenship to integrate successfully into Estonia's business sphere. Representatives of the Russian community in Latvia, unlike in Estonia, had to accept the principles of "policies of nepotism" that were used in Latvia. In recent statements about the perception of corruption, Estonia is gradually distancing itself from Latvia.
It may be that the development of Russian parties on the left wing of politics in Latvia can be attributed to the fact that the Russian community here is relative larger, that Soviet traditions continue to exist in Latvia's larger towns and cities, and that there is a unique political environment here. The Russian Party in Estonia, as well as other political movements which represent the Russian community, were distinct pocket parties until the events of 26 April 2007 [when the Estonian government moved a Soviet military memorial to a military cemetery]. They could not overcome the 5 per cent vote barrier that is necessary to win seats in Parliament. That is why the Centre Party of Edgar Savisaar has represented the interests of the Russian minority at the political level since 1995. In addition to Savisaar's party on the centre left, leftist policies in the Estonian parliament are also represented by the Social Democrats. Parties in the Estonian parliament operate on the basis of ideology, not ethnicity, and in this they differ from the situation in Latvia, where there are Latvian right wing and Russian left wing parties.
Haughtiness of Politicians Splits, Weakens
During the April riots, Savisaar was mayor of Tallinn, and his failure to act pushed quite a few voters away from his party. Events in Tallinn, similarly to what happened when Latvia introduced school reforms, showed that integration policy requires active consultations between both sides. A multicultural society does not appear all on its own. It is the duty of the political elite to make sure that the integration of a multicultural and political nation does not occur in a slipshod way. Estonia's governing politicians were convinced about themselves, and they delayed Russian language reforms in Estonian schools. That is precisely the reason why integration policies developed during the last few years absolutely collapsed in Tallinn in April of this year. The events in Tallinn showed that differences in the historical interpretation of Estonians and Russians are expanding, not narrowing. There are fundamental differences between Estonians and Russians with respect to the quality of life in the future and about future relations with Russia. Research done by the Estonian sociologist Andrus Saar shows that differences between the Estonian and the Russian communities in Estonia are not dependent on increased economic welfare.
In this situation, it would be short-sighted to rely on the principles of the free market in integration policy. Economic policy has only an indirect effect on the integration of a political nation. It is utopian to think that people who came from the collective society of the Soviet Union will learn about their rights without the appropriate education and will join together into a political nation in Latvia or Estonia. A power change is taking place in Russia right now, and domestic policy positions affect the Russian communities of Latvia and Estonia. It is vitally important to ensure equal rules of the economic game, to work very hard on links between those who are integrating and those who are being integrated. The rules of the economic game are clear in Estonia, but the Estonian government must now compensate for the tactical mistakes which were the result of the haughtiness of Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Latvia must continue with the integration policies that have been launched, but at long last we must make our economic system transparent, we must introduce a system of tax declarations, we must stop the spiraling process of inflation, and we must reduce our current accounts deficit. Governments in both countries must think about how to resolve a problem that is acute both for Latvia and for Estonia - how to ensure high-quality TV broadcasts in Russian about events in Estonia and Latvia, thus reducing the pressure of propaganda which comes from Kremlin-controlled information channels at this time.
(c) 2007 BBC Monitoring European. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning. All rights Reserved.
Elite, Kremlis un minoritātes Baltijā
Andris Sprūds, Veiko Spolītis, RSU mācībspēki
Latvijas valdošā koalīcija šobrīd acīmredzami cenšas uzlabot attiecības ar Krieviju. Tomēr kā jebkurās attiecībās nepieciešama abpusēja ieinteresētība jeb, citiem vārdiem, divi partneri, lai „nodejotu tango”. Igaunijas notikumi radījuši jautājumus gan par krievvalodīgo sabiedrības integrācijas dziļumu Igaunijā un Latvijā, gan par Krievijas klātbūtni un lomu šajos notikumos, tās „tautiešu politikas” raksturu un mērķiem. Šodienas tehnoloģijas neievēro fiziskas robežas, tāpēc satelīta televīzija un internets palīdz valstīm sasniegt auditorijas, kuras agrāk bija jāsasniedz ar lektoru palīdzību. Baltijas valstu minoritāšu politika joprojām tiek skatīta saistībā ar Krievijā notiekošo. Nesenie notikumi Tallinā pārliecināja skeptiķus par dalību ES un NATO lēmuma pareizību, tomēr neatkarīgi no dalības šajās organizācijās Baltijas valstīm joprojām ir jānodrošina sabiedrības līdzsvarota attīstība, kas ir priekšnoteikums to suverēnai autonomijai ilgtermiņā. Tāpēc šis raksts centīsies pirmajā daļā skaidrot Krievijas „tautiešu” politikas mērķus un instrumentus un otrajā daļā analizēt Latvijas un Igaunijas atšķirības minoritāšu situācijā.
Krievijas „tautiešu” politika
Vladimirs Putins ir stiprinājis varas vertikāli gan iekšpolitikā, gan ārpolitikā. Acīmredzami, ārējā politika ir kļuvusi koordinētāka, izteiksmīgāka un uzaudzēto „enerģētikas muskuļu” iespaidā — pašpārliecinātāka. Kaimiņos esošajām mazajām valstīm jārēķinās, ka lielvalsts, kas atguvusies no vājuma posma, parasti tiecas arī atgūt savu ietekmi. „20. gadsimta lielākās ģeopolitiskās katastrofas — PSRS sabrukuma” zaudējumu minimizēšanā postpadomju telpā Kremļa rīcībā nav tikai „cietās varas” atribūti: kodolieroči vai enerģētika, bet arī vesela virkne „postimperiālo” jeb „mīkstās varas” instrumentu: noieta un darba tirgu piedāvājums, pieaugošas labklājības un kultūras pievilcība, normu piesaukšana un vēsturiskie simboli.
Normas un simboli spēlējuši nozīmīgu lomu Krievijas politikā attiecībā uz tautiešiem Baltijā, visupirms Igaunijā un Latvijā. 90. gados Krievijas rīcībā pamatā bija tikai „nūjas ietekmes” iespējas —kritika par pilsonības un valodas likumdošanas normām starptautiskā līmenī un divpusējās attiecībās, un tā tika atkārtota bieži un asi, piesaucot arī ekonomisko sankciju iespējamību. Tomēr jāatzīst, Krievijas publiskā kritika par izturēšanos pret nepilsoņiem faktiski līdz pat 1998. gadam neietekmēja kopumā konstruktīvas divpusējās attiecības. Zīmīga šajā sakarā bija Igaunijas krīze 1993. gadā, kad Narvas reģiona iedzīvotāji faktiski atteicās pakļauties Igaunijas valdībai un Kremlis kopā ar EDSO kļuva par konflikta starpniekiem. Protams, šeit varētu jautāt, vai šāda nostāja bija labas gribas izpausme vai politiskas un ekonomiskas nepieciešamības diktēta. Lai kāda arī būtu Kremļa toreizējas rīcības motivācija, nepārprotami ir tas, ka Krievijai trūka politisko un vēsturisko simbolu un finansiālo līdzekļu, ar kuru palīdzību tā spētu efektīvi mobilizēt krieviski runājošo sabiedrību. Piemēram, šobrīd tik aktualizētos Uzvaras svētkus postkomunistiskajā Krievijā oficiāli atkal sāka atzīmēt tikai 1995. gadā.
Šobrīd situācija ir mainījusies. Papildus retorikai par krievvalodīgo diskrimināciju Igaunijā un Latvijā Krievijas valdība acīmredzami vēlas un spēj veicināt daudz plašāku krievvalodīgo sabiedrības grupu mobilizāciju. Iepriekš „paralēlā sabiedrība”, kas pārsvarā orientējās uz Krieviju, Latvijā un Igaunijā galvenokārt sastāvēja no atsevišķiem politiskajiem spēkiem, ekonomiski ieinteresētiem grupējumiem un apātiskiem neapmierinātajiem. Pašlaik Krievijas ārējā tēla vitalitāte, vēsturiskās un kultūras kopības piesaukšana, kā arī finansiālais atbalsts jau spēj aktivizēt plašākas krievvalodīgo sabiedrības daļas. Kā parādīja 9. maija atzīmēšana gan Tallinā, gan Rīgā, Krievijas aktīva atsaukšanās uz vēsturiskajiem simboliem atrada ne mazums dzirdīgu ausu, ieskaitot jaunu cilvēku vidū.
Jāņem gan arī vērā, ka Krievijas gadījumā, tās „tautiešu” politikas raksturu un motivāciju nosaka ne tikai ārpolitiskie apsvērumi. Krievijas 19. gadsimta ārlietu ministra Aleksandra Gorčakova vārdiem runājot, Krievija ir vienlaicīgi „gan varena, gan vāja valsts”. Krievijas viens no vislielākajiem trūkumiem ir valsti vienojošas idejas trūkums. Pašlaik tā vairāk veidojas no atsevišķiem pagātnes simboliem un pašreizējā enerģētiskā lielvalstiskuma pasvītrošanas nevis skaidras nākotnes idejiskās vīzijas. Vladimirs Putins kā prezidents lielā mērā kļuvis par lielas Krievijas sabiedrības daļas vēlmju iemiesotāju. Tomēr šāda personificēta valstiskā ideja nevar būt ilglaicīga, īpaši Putinam atstājot prezidenta amatu. Acīmredzami, Krievijas publiskajā telpā pirms vēlēšanām politiskie spēki būs tendēti konkurēt par lielākā patriotisma ideju aizstāvju imidžu, un šādās situācijās nav tālu ne līdz populismam, ne ienaidnieka tēlu meklēšanai. Politiskā cīņa un pašidentifikācijas nepieciešamība Krievijas nostājai krievvalodīgo jautājumā un attiecībām ar Latviju un Igauniju noteikti piedos papildus pretrunīguma un emocionalitātes devu.
Pilsoniskās apziņas un aktivitātes pieaugums un plurālisms sabiedrībā noteikti ir apsveicama parādība, tomēr potenciāli bīstamu kokteili veido ne vienmēr veiksmīgi integrētas vai arī ne vienmēr integrēties vēlošas sabiedrības daļas neapmierinātība kombinācijā ar citas valsts „sevis meklējumiem” un manipulācijas iespējām. Un arvien izteiktāka tendence, ka 16. martam un 9. maijam jāgatavojas kā sabiedrības daļu fiziskai un emocionālai konfrontācijai, kas iet kopsolī ar starpvalstu divpusējo attiecību saasināšanos, skaidri demonstrē postimperiālas sabiedrības konsolidācijas un starpvalstu attiecību normalizācijas grūtības un ierobežojumus.
Minoritātes Igaunijā un Latvijā
Runājot par tautiešiem Baltijas valstīs, oficiālā Krievija cenšas nemitīgi izmantot terminu krievvalodīgie, kas ir nemanot iegājis arī Igaunijas un Latvijas ikdienas valodas apritē. Šis ir Kremlim parocīgs apzīmējums Baltijas valstu vienotās telpas raksturošanai, jo tradicionāli lietuvieši, latvieši, un, lai arī mazāk, tomēr arī igauņi ir bijuši divvalodīgi. Iemesliem, kāpēc Latvijas un Igaunijas diskusijās tiek izmantots Kremļa polittehnologu apzīmējums krievu minoritātei Baltijas valstīs, ir nepieciešams cits pētījums. Tomēr, neskatoties uz minoritāšu raksturlieluma politisku apzīmējumu atšķirībām, Latvijas un Igaunijas diskusijas par minoritātēm galvenokārt ir noteikušas atšķirības partiju politikā un iedzīvotāju izvietojumā.
Atšķirībā no Latvijas Igaunijas krievu kopiena dzīvo kompakti valsts Ziemeļaustrumos un Tallinas guļamrajonos. Iedzīvotāju kopskaita ziņā etnisko igauņu 1990. gadu sākumā bija par 10 % vairāk nekā latviešu. Latviešu un igauņu valodas pozīciju nostiprināšana bija nacionālo partiju programmas noteikta daļa. Tomēr atšķirībā no Latvijas politiskā elite Igaunijā nebaidījās pieņemt tautā nepopulārus liberālas ekonomikas un nodokļu politikas lēmumus. Šādi, piemēram, 1991. gadā tika ieviesta nodokļu deklarēšanas sistēma, kura kalpoja par priekšnoteikumu caurskatāmas ekonomiskās un politiskās sistēmas attīstībai. Vienoti spēles noteikumi atļāva bez pilsonības palikušajiem krievu kopienas pārstāvjiem veiksmīgi integrēties Igaunijas uzņēmējdarbības sfērā. Atšķirībā no Igaunijas Latvijas krievu kopienas pārstāvjiem bija jāspēlē pēc Latvijā pieņemtajiem „nepotisma politikas” principiem, un pēdējo gadu korupcijas uztveres novērtējumos Igaunija pakāpeniski attālinās no Latvijas.[1]
Iespējams, tieši relatīvi lielāka krievu kopiena un padomju tradīcijas Latvijas lielākajās pilsētās kombinācijā ar savdabīgo politisko vidi noteica krievu partiju attīstību politiskā spektra kreisajā flangā. Atšķirībā no Latvijas, Igaunijas Krievu partija un citas krievu kopienu pārstāvošas politiskās kustības līdz 2007. gada 26. aprīļa notikumiem bija izteiktas kabatas partijas, kuras nespēja pārvarēt iekļūšanai parlamentā nepieciešamo 5 % barjeru. Tāpēc krievu minoritātes intereses politiskā līmenī kopš 1995. gada ir pārstāvējusi Edgara Savisāra (Edgar Savisaar) Centra partija. Papildus E. Savisāra kreisi centriskajai partijai Igaunijas parlamentā kreiso politiku pārstāv arī sociāldemokrāti. Šādi atšķirībā no Latvijas etniskā dalījuma latviešu labējās un krievu kreisajās partijās Igaunijas parlamenta partijas darbojas nevis pēc etniskā, bet gan ideoloģiskā principa.
Politiķu uzpūtība šķeļ un vājina
Aprīļa grautiņu laikā Tallinas mērs Savisārs ar savu neizdarību no savas partijas atstūma ne vienu vien vēlētāju. Tallinas notikumi līdzīgi Latvijas skolu reformas ieviešanai sekojošajiem notikumiem parādīja, ka integrācijas politikā ir nepieciešamas abu iesaistīto pušu aktīvas konsultācijas. Multikulturāla sabiedrība nerodas pati no sevis, politiskajai elitei ir pienākums nodrošināt, lai multikulturālas un politiskas nācijas integrācija nenotiek pašplūsmā. Tieši valdošo politiķu pašpārliecinātība, iekavētā krievu valodas reforma Igaunijas skolās noteica pēdējo gadu integrācijas politikas izgāšanos Tallinā šā gada aprīļa beigās. Tallinas notikumu fonā atklājās, ka atšķirības igauņu un krievu kopienas vēstures interpretācijā nevis samazinās, bet gan palielinās.[2] Kardinālas atšķirības starp igauņiem un krieviem eksistē gan uztverē par nākotnes dzīves kvalitāti, gan arī par nākotnes attiecībām ar Krieviju. Igauņu sociologa Andrusa Sāra (Andrus Saar) pētījumi atklāj, ka atšķirības starp igauņu un krievu kopienām Igaunijā nav atkarīgi no ekonomiskās labklājības pieauguma.[3]
Šādā situācijā būtu tuvredzīgi paļauties uz brīvā tirgus principiem integrācijas politikā. Ekonomiskā labklājība tikai pastarpināti veicina politiskas nācijas integrāciju. Tāpēc paļauties, ka no padomju kolektīvās sabiedrības nākuši cilvēki bez attiecīgas izglītības kļūs par savas tiesības zinošiem indivīdiem un vienosies Igaunijas vai Latvijas politiskā nācijā, ir utopija. Situācijā, kad Krievijā notiek varas maiņa un iekšpolitiskā pozicionēšanās skar Latvijas un Igaunijas krievu kopienas, ir vitāli svarīgi nodrošināt vienādus ekonomiskās spēles noteikumus un aktīvi strādāt integrētājiem ar integrējamajiem. Igaunijas gadījumā ekonomiskās spēles noteikumi ir atklāti, bet Igaunijas valdībai šobrīd ir jānovērš premjera Ansipa (Andrus Ansip) vīzdegunības dēļ pieļautās taktiskās kļūdas. Latvijā ir jāturpina iesāktā integrācijas politika, bet ir beidzot jāpadara caurskatāma mūsu ekonomiskā sistēma, jāiedarbina nodokļu deklarēšanas sistēma, jāaptur inflācijas spirāle un jāsamazina tekošā konta deficīts. Abu valstu valdībām, savukārt, šobrīd ir jādomā, kā atrisināt Latvijas un Igaunijas akūtu problēmu — nodrošināt kvalitatīvas TV pārraides krievu valodā par notikumiem Igaunijā un Latvijā, šādi ļaujot mazināt Kremļa kontrolēto informācijas kanālu propagandas spiedienu.
______________________
[1] 2006. gadā Transparency International indeksā Igaunija atradās 24. vietā un Latvija 49. vietā. http://www.trasnsparency.org/policy_%20research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006
[2] Integrācijas fonda pētījums parādīja, ka 2002. gadā 43% krievu uzskatīja, ka Igaunija brīvprātīgi iestājās PSRS, bet 2005. gadā šādu cilvēku skaits bija pieaudzis līdz 56%. Venelaste arvates astus Eesti vabatahtlikult Nõukogude Liitu http://www.sloleht.ee/ 2007. gada 21. maijā
[3] Andrus Sāra priekšlasījums Rīgā, organizācijas Dialogi diskusijas ietvaros 2007. gada 18. maijā
And the winner is....Valdis Zatlers!
The rules of the game in the Latvian political elite are as obscure as the past of their representatives. For a month two biggest coalition parties, Christian First (PP) and Peoples Party (TP) were playing according to the rules and offering their respective candidates, Ms Karina Pētersone and Mr Māris Riekstiņš. Yesterday the speaker of the house, ooops, Saeima announced that all coalition parties need to agree on a common candidate before May 31 presidential elections. Immediately there was an announcement about the European Communities judge Ms Egīls Levits as a presidential candidate. Yesterday evenening Mr Levits declined the offer as before had done also long standing diplomat in Finland and writer Ms Anna Žīgure and the former rector of the University of Latvia, Mr Ivars Lācis. Immediately after Mr Levits declined the offer it was Latvian Transport Supremo, Mr. Ainārs Šlesers who announced that governing coalition must agree on a common candidate today, because otherwise the stability of the governing coalition is becoming questionable.
Thus, today the governing coalitionnegotiated, and at 20.00CET+1 LETA news agency announced that the nominee of the Latvian governing coalition for the post of the Latvian president is Mr. Valdis Zatlers!
What a rollercoaster in Latvian politics! Just minutes ago Mr. Zatlers gave an interview to the LatvianTV station and answered that he was given 24 hours for agreeing on the offer. Mr Zatlers is a doctor and for the last 15 years he was a director of the Latvian Orthopedic Centre. Now the journalists will have to find who is Mr Zatlers. Right now agreement about Mr Zatlers as the presidential candidate have openly announced Minister of Interior, Mr Ivars Godmanis (LC) and Prime Minster, Mr Aigars Kalvītis (TP).
Lets wait until tomorrow, when there would be more information, because until May 31 there is still some time left.
Thus, today the governing coalitionnegotiated, and at 20.00CET+1 LETA news agency announced that the nominee of the Latvian governing coalition for the post of the Latvian president is Mr. Valdis Zatlers!
What a rollercoaster in Latvian politics! Just minutes ago Mr. Zatlers gave an interview to the LatvianTV station and answered that he was given 24 hours for agreeing on the offer. Mr Zatlers is a doctor and for the last 15 years he was a director of the Latvian Orthopedic Centre. Now the journalists will have to find who is Mr Zatlers. Right now agreement about Mr Zatlers as the presidential candidate have openly announced Minister of Interior, Mr Ivars Godmanis (LC) and Prime Minster, Mr Aigars Kalvītis (TP).
Lets wait until tomorrow, when there would be more information, because until May 31 there is still some time left.
Monday, May 21, 2007
Presidential elections in Latvia -surprizes!? (updated)
After a fishing weekend on the Gauja I'm back in Riga and the summer is in full bloom! Fishing went well and because of too much sun & fresh air I felt a bit tired today. Yesterday there was nothing spectacular on the De Facto TV programm (Latvian TV) about the domestic politics in Latvia. It means that the probability of having the Maire of Ventspils stipendiate list disclosed until presidential elections on June 6 is diminishing every second.
Couple of hours ago there came an unexpected announcement that presidential elections would take place on May 31 instead! The speaker of the Saeima, Mr Indulis Emsis (ZZS) while answering to the journalist question: why there is such a need to have presidential elections a week prior previously agreed date announced, that the May 31 date is simply beautiful.
In addition rumours about Egils Levits as non partisan candidate for the presidential post materialized, and the present governing coalition probably thought about the common candidate, but unfortunately this opportunity was offered by the speaker of the Saeima. Therefore the most likely scenario for first round of elections is that neither of the candidates -Māris Riekstiņš (TP), Karīna Pētersone (PP/LC) and Sandra Kalniete - gets single majority (51) support of the parliament, and the second round shall be announced. After the first round there is a possibility of the reshuffle in the government and replacement of Aigars Kalvītis (TP) with Ainārs Šlesers (PP). Obviously, the candidate from the People's party for the second round of the presidential elections would be Kalvītis. Brrrrr... .
What a speed of events in Latvia these days!!! Just 30.min ago Member of the European Communities Court, Mr Egils Levits declined his candidacy for the post of the Latvian president. Mr Šlesers immediately announced that governing coalition must agree on a common candidate until tomorrow evening. Therefore, I assume that the scenario described above seems the most likely one and reshuffle of the government is probably on agenda. Overheated economy, emigrating workforce, housing bubble looming on the horizont, and 25% current account deficit is unsustainable for the Latvian small economy, thus someone must get start acting! Mr. Kalvitis is not coping with his tasks, thus he should realize that and GO!
p.s. Also there was an attempt to assassinate the head of the Latvian Customs office criminal investigation unit Mr. Vaškevics this late afternoon. He luckily survived and PM and the Minister of Interior have announced that this heinous act was an attack on the Latvian state. Mr. Vaškevics survived the attack, however he is still odioze enough due to the scrutinity of the Corruption Fighting Bureau that has discovered that his real and declared incomes do not match, thus how credible are anouncements of the PM...
Couple of hours ago there came an unexpected announcement that presidential elections would take place on May 31 instead! The speaker of the Saeima, Mr Indulis Emsis (ZZS) while answering to the journalist question: why there is such a need to have presidential elections a week prior previously agreed date announced, that the May 31 date is simply beautiful.
In addition rumours about Egils Levits as non partisan candidate for the presidential post materialized, and the present governing coalition probably thought about the common candidate, but unfortunately this opportunity was offered by the speaker of the Saeima. Therefore the most likely scenario for first round of elections is that neither of the candidates -Māris Riekstiņš (TP), Karīna Pētersone (PP/LC) and Sandra Kalniete - gets single majority (51) support of the parliament, and the second round shall be announced. After the first round there is a possibility of the reshuffle in the government and replacement of Aigars Kalvītis (TP) with Ainārs Šlesers (PP). Obviously, the candidate from the People's party for the second round of the presidential elections would be Kalvītis. Brrrrr... .
What a speed of events in Latvia these days!!! Just 30.min ago Member of the European Communities Court, Mr Egils Levits declined his candidacy for the post of the Latvian president. Mr Šlesers immediately announced that governing coalition must agree on a common candidate until tomorrow evening. Therefore, I assume that the scenario described above seems the most likely one and reshuffle of the government is probably on agenda. Overheated economy, emigrating workforce, housing bubble looming on the horizont, and 25% current account deficit is unsustainable for the Latvian small economy, thus someone must get start acting! Mr. Kalvitis is not coping with his tasks, thus he should realize that and GO!
p.s. Also there was an attempt to assassinate the head of the Latvian Customs office criminal investigation unit Mr. Vaškevics this late afternoon. He luckily survived and PM and the Minister of Interior have announced that this heinous act was an attack on the Latvian state. Mr. Vaškevics survived the attack, however he is still odioze enough due to the scrutinity of the Corruption Fighting Bureau that has discovered that his real and declared incomes do not match, thus how credible are anouncements of the PM...
Friday, May 18, 2007
Fishing weekend
While the heads of the EU-27 meet the authoritarian head of the state near the river Volga I have decided to take the weeknd off and to go near the river Gauja. Answering to the questions of journalists about detention of the leader of the Russian opposition Gari Kasparov at the Moscow airport Russian presidential retorted in the traditional manner - prior showing on our domestic problems in Russia you European should consider problems of Russian minorities in Latvia & Estonia... . What else one can comment on such a retort, nothing.
In the meantime the Latvian PM is happy about the ratified border treaty with Russia and I think that he truly believes that Latvia has got more favours with Russia while leaving Estonia in shadows. It is a dagerous game Mr. Kalvitis especially prior the presidential elections where you hope to get run in the second round.
Enough politics, it is sunny outside, Eves and cherries are in full bloom and I hope there would be some fish in river Gauja. All my friends have a NICE WEEKEND!!
In the meantime the Latvian PM is happy about the ratified border treaty with Russia and I think that he truly believes that Latvia has got more favours with Russia while leaving Estonia in shadows. It is a dagerous game Mr. Kalvitis especially prior the presidential elections where you hope to get run in the second round.
Enough politics, it is sunny outside, Eves and cherries are in full bloom and I hope there would be some fish in river Gauja. All my friends have a NICE WEEKEND!!
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
Estonian "Monument affair" and possible shifts in the Latvian government
For the last two weeks I was extremely busy due to the formative events in Tallinn and my fourteen BA thesis supervisees at the Riga Stradins University. Tallinn events came unexpectedly, because until the last moment the Estonian PM said that the symbol of the bygone era would not be redeployed prior the May 9th. It is still unknown why the PM wanted to escalate the situation and only the history shall teach us reasons for that. However, this very Thursday we shall see in Samara how the EU and Russian representatives will get along, and what kind of repercussions Estonian government shall bear because of severance of the EU - Russian relations.
Accross the border from Estonia, last week the Head of the Latvian Central Electoral office, Mr Cimdars anounced that the date for the popular referendum in Latvia, concerning amendmends in the law of security organizations, will take place on 07.07.07. It is the day when Madame Freiberga will be her last day in the office. It is official now as well as final number of signatures collected was 214 000. Also, yesterday the Riga Region District Court announced that former/still acting maire of Ventspils will stay inprisoned while prosecutors office is still collecting information about his shady deals corrupting Latvian body politics for the last 15 years. Now there are still about three weeks until the Latvian presidential elections and all major parties have their candidates up and running.
People' s Party (TP) in their party congress decided to have former Ambassador to the US, Mr. Māris Riekstiņš as the presidential choice. Following the course their coalition mates, the united Christian First (PP) & Latvian Way Parties decided to present present mellow non - entity, the Ethnic Integration minister, Ms Kārina Pētersone as their candidate. Her candidacy is funny, because rumours about her as a lover of the former head of the Supreme Council, Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs are spreading since her candidacy has been set-up by the union of the Latvian way & the Christian First Party. Social Democrats (LSDSP) are not represented in the Saeima already for the second consecutive term, but they still presented a star politician of the Popular Front era Mr Dainis Īvāns as one of theirs. Union of Farmers and Greens offered this post to the former rector of the University of Latvia Mr Ivars Lācis, but nobody wants to make him/herself a political corpse while being nominated by THIS party and Mr Lācis declined his nomination. Fatherland Party in the meantime is still in the waiting position and do not have one single candidate.
As far the opposition is concerned, then the Russian interests representing Reconciliation centre and Human Rights in Latvia parties obviously have not proposed anyone. The opposition New Era, however, has not changed the tack and still stays with the candidate from the September 2006, Ms Sandra Kalniete. As an opposition party member she has little chance unless the present government falls and that is a rather likely event in Latvia during upcoming month, especially concidering the record of 13 governments during17 years since Latvia regained its independence (making the government serve about 1,13 years on the average). Present PM rules the middle Baltic state since December 2004 and he is true achiever if not the illegal election campaign financing. Thus, the fact that corruption is a rule and not an accident among the Latvian ruling circles is becoming apparent.
First, both the Madame President and the presidential candidate from the People's Party hinted that the disclosure of the list of politicians who were funded by the odious maire of Ventspils might bring grave consequences for the present governing coalition. Even before utterances of the Madame President the State Audit office found that 32 MP's from the governing coalition have failed declaring their incomes in a proper way, and due to the Latvian Internal Revenue Service lack of timely involvement those offenders would not be prosecuted.
In case there is a list of politicians being funded by odioze maire of Ventspils it should be made public prior presidential elections in the Latvian parliament on the June 6th. Actually the shade of the maire is hanging over the Union of Farmers and Greens (UFG) that was funded by former maire of Ventspils, and this party has four ministerial positions as well as the post of the speaker of the parliament. If Mr Emsis is still struggling with his duties then Latvian farmers have openly asked Mr Roze (UFG) to resign from the post of the Minister of Agriculture. After the tragedy in the Reģi elderly home the Welfare Minister Ms Dagnija Staķe (UFG) should have resigned already, but her party bosses openly stated that there are no better specialist in Latvia to clean the mess in the Latvian system of the elderly care. Just about three weeks ago Latvian teachers sent a joint petition (with 6000 signatures) to the Minister of Education, Ms Baiba Rivža (UFG) asking to raise teachers salaries in case Latvian students do not want to miss their final examinations this year because of their strike... . The situation with UFG ministers is tense because they have lost their legitimacy not only in the eyes of the majority Latvian electorate, but also in the eyes of the Latvian PM.
In the meantime the main opposition New Era party is against signing of the border treaty with Russia due to the legal wranglings. The former made the Saeima Head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr Andris Bērziņš (Latvian Way) a laughing-stock due to his hesitant attitude about the declaration of the Latvian parliament showing solidarity with Estonia. Therefore, there is no immediate possibility to see the UFG exiting and New Era entering the governing coalition. However, both Mr Riekstiņš and Ms Pētersone are rather weak candidates, that it seems that they are just for the first round run-off. It is more likely that after the June 6 or whereabouts the government might fall. Following the fall of the government the Latvian Transport Supremo might get his long awaited premiership, and shiny incumbent PM might be set up as a candidate for the second tour of the presidential race. Anyway, Latvian post - Soviet nomenklatura is witnessing one of the most serious shake-ups in its post-independence history. It somehow reminds me the omenous events in Seoul in 2000, when the Millenium Party was founded and clean-up of Korean politics took place. It does not mean that thus serious clean-up should happen in Latvia as well, but lets wait and see!
P.S. There is an article I wrote for the Bremen University East European Research Center.
Accross the border from Estonia, last week the Head of the Latvian Central Electoral office, Mr Cimdars anounced that the date for the popular referendum in Latvia, concerning amendmends in the law of security organizations, will take place on 07.07.07. It is the day when Madame Freiberga will be her last day in the office. It is official now as well as final number of signatures collected was 214 000. Also, yesterday the Riga Region District Court announced that former/still acting maire of Ventspils will stay inprisoned while prosecutors office is still collecting information about his shady deals corrupting Latvian body politics for the last 15 years. Now there are still about three weeks until the Latvian presidential elections and all major parties have their candidates up and running.
People' s Party (TP) in their party congress decided to have former Ambassador to the US, Mr. Māris Riekstiņš as the presidential choice. Following the course their coalition mates, the united Christian First (PP) & Latvian Way Parties decided to present present mellow non - entity, the Ethnic Integration minister, Ms Kārina Pētersone as their candidate. Her candidacy is funny, because rumours about her as a lover of the former head of the Supreme Council, Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs are spreading since her candidacy has been set-up by the union of the Latvian way & the Christian First Party. Social Democrats (LSDSP) are not represented in the Saeima already for the second consecutive term, but they still presented a star politician of the Popular Front era Mr Dainis Īvāns as one of theirs. Union of Farmers and Greens offered this post to the former rector of the University of Latvia Mr Ivars Lācis, but nobody wants to make him/herself a political corpse while being nominated by THIS party and Mr Lācis declined his nomination. Fatherland Party in the meantime is still in the waiting position and do not have one single candidate.
As far the opposition is concerned, then the Russian interests representing Reconciliation centre and Human Rights in Latvia parties obviously have not proposed anyone. The opposition New Era, however, has not changed the tack and still stays with the candidate from the September 2006, Ms Sandra Kalniete. As an opposition party member she has little chance unless the present government falls and that is a rather likely event in Latvia during upcoming month, especially concidering the record of 13 governments during17 years since Latvia regained its independence (making the government serve about 1,13 years on the average). Present PM rules the middle Baltic state since December 2004 and he is true achiever if not the illegal election campaign financing. Thus, the fact that corruption is a rule and not an accident among the Latvian ruling circles is becoming apparent.
First, both the Madame President and the presidential candidate from the People's Party hinted that the disclosure of the list of politicians who were funded by the odious maire of Ventspils might bring grave consequences for the present governing coalition. Even before utterances of the Madame President the State Audit office found that 32 MP's from the governing coalition have failed declaring their incomes in a proper way, and due to the Latvian Internal Revenue Service lack of timely involvement those offenders would not be prosecuted.
In case there is a list of politicians being funded by odioze maire of Ventspils it should be made public prior presidential elections in the Latvian parliament on the June 6th. Actually the shade of the maire is hanging over the Union of Farmers and Greens (UFG) that was funded by former maire of Ventspils, and this party has four ministerial positions as well as the post of the speaker of the parliament. If Mr Emsis is still struggling with his duties then Latvian farmers have openly asked Mr Roze (UFG) to resign from the post of the Minister of Agriculture. After the tragedy in the Reģi elderly home the Welfare Minister Ms Dagnija Staķe (UFG) should have resigned already, but her party bosses openly stated that there are no better specialist in Latvia to clean the mess in the Latvian system of the elderly care. Just about three weeks ago Latvian teachers sent a joint petition (with 6000 signatures) to the Minister of Education, Ms Baiba Rivža (UFG) asking to raise teachers salaries in case Latvian students do not want to miss their final examinations this year because of their strike... . The situation with UFG ministers is tense because they have lost their legitimacy not only in the eyes of the majority Latvian electorate, but also in the eyes of the Latvian PM.
In the meantime the main opposition New Era party is against signing of the border treaty with Russia due to the legal wranglings. The former made the Saeima Head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr Andris Bērziņš (Latvian Way) a laughing-stock due to his hesitant attitude about the declaration of the Latvian parliament showing solidarity with Estonia. Therefore, there is no immediate possibility to see the UFG exiting and New Era entering the governing coalition. However, both Mr Riekstiņš and Ms Pētersone are rather weak candidates, that it seems that they are just for the first round run-off. It is more likely that after the June 6 or whereabouts the government might fall. Following the fall of the government the Latvian Transport Supremo might get his long awaited premiership, and shiny incumbent PM might be set up as a candidate for the second tour of the presidential race. Anyway, Latvian post - Soviet nomenklatura is witnessing one of the most serious shake-ups in its post-independence history. It somehow reminds me the omenous events in Seoul in 2000, when the Millenium Party was founded and clean-up of Korean politics took place. It does not mean that thus serious clean-up should happen in Latvia as well, but lets wait and see!
P.S. There is an article I wrote for the Bremen University East European Research Center.
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